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I. BACKGROUND 
Two fundamental principles inform our system of justice: the re­
lated concepts of notice and the right of parties to be heard by present­
ing their full case at a trial on the merits. While notice encompasses 
many aspects of a trial or hearing, this discussion focuses on what 
constitutes adequate notice to parties when courts seek to control the 
shape and conduct of litigation. More specifically, this article ad­
dresses the issues surrounding consolidation, the situation that arises 
when a court decides the merits of a dispute based solely on the record 
produced at a hearing on motion for a preliminary injunction. When 
notice of consolidation is absent or inadequate, parties are often de­
prived of the opportunity to put their full case before the trier of fact. 
In our view, problems associated with consolidating the prelimi­
nary hearing with the trial on the merits deserve serious consideration 
by the courts and by the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules. We 
believe that a rule change is necessitated by current practice in order 
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to provide better protection for litigants who find the rules of the game 
have been changed without adequate noti<;:e. Lack of notice often 
means that parties are forced to engage in cdllaterallitigation, such as 
appealing a court's consolidation decision or moving for a new trial, 
rather than addressing the merits of their case. Amendments to the 
civil rules requiring that actual and adequate notice be given to the 
parties by the court, trial or appellate, before consolidation takes place 
would reduce unfair prejudice which results when parties are forced to 
engage in collateral litigation over procedural problems. Such an 
amendment would also be beneficial because it would reduce the bur­
den such litigation has on appellate court dockets. 
After a hearing on a motion for preliminary relief,l the decision 
on the merits may occur in the trial court or on appeal. Because a 
preliminary injunction restrains the defendant, the merits should be 
addressed as soon as possible. While Rule 65(a)(2)2 gives district 
courts the authority to consolidate a hearing on a preliminary injunc­
tion motion with the trial on the merits, no such express authority 
exists at the appellate level. The lack of a formal notice requirement in 
Rule 65(a)(2) and under case law has caused, and continues to cause, 
problems for litigants ~nd judges who do not provide adequate notice. 3 
More explicit protection is required. In this regard, amendments to 
the civil rules are needed. 
Failure at the hearing on the preliminary injunction does not dic­
tate failure on the merits. As the Supreme Court stated in University 
of Texas v. Camenisch,4 a party "is not required to prove his case in 
full at a preliminary-injunction hearing."5 Such hearings are charac­
teristically marked by the need to show entitlement to an order which 
l. For a discussion of the various criteria that federal courts having applied in grant­
ing or denying motions for preliminary relief, see generally Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions: 
The Varying Standards, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 173 (1984). 
2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2) provides: 
Consolidation of Hearing With Trial on Merits. 
Before or after the commencement of the hearing of an application for a prelimi­
nary injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits to be 
advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application. Even when this 
consolidation is not ordered, any evidence received upon an application for a pre­
liminary injunction which would be admissable upon the trial on the merits be­
comes part of the record on the trial and need not be repeated upon the trial. 
This subdivision (a)(2) shall be so construed and applied as to save to the parties 
any rights they may have to trial by jury. 
FED. R. CIv. P. 65(a)(2). 
3. See generally 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE­
DURE § 2950 (1973 & Supp. 1989). 
4. 451 U.S. 390 (1981). 
5. [d. at 395 (citing Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961)). 
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maintains the status quo of the parties. The hearings are often held 
under less than ideal conditions because the parties have put together 
their cases hastily. Therefore, it is unfair to expect them to develop 
fully their claims or defenses on the merits.6 
The Court in Camenisch also instructed that it is a fallacy to as­
sume that success or failure at a preliminary injunction hearing is sy­
nonymous with ultimate success or failure at trial. Success for the 
defendant does not mean that the plaintiff will lose at trial, because the 
plaintiff may not have been able to prove irreparable harm at the hear­
ing but may still be able to make out a case for relief at trial. More­
over, the findings of fact and conclusions of law drawn therefrom "are 
not binding at trial on the merits."7 Therefore, as the Court in 
Camenisch instructed, "it is generally inappropriate for a federal court 
at the preliminary-injunction stage to give a final judgment on the 
merits."8 
Under current law, the consolidation decisions fall into two broad 
categories of cases: express consolidation and "de facto"9 consolida­
tion. In the first group are placed those cases in which the district 
court, after notice to the parties, combines a hearing on preliminary 
relief with a trial on the merits. The "de facto" consolidation cases 
include those decisions in which the court, usually (but not always) an 
appellate court, reaches the merits, without notice to the parties, based 
on the record developed at the preliminary hearing. 
To appreciate fully the current law on consolidation, this article 
first examines its historical antecedents prior to the 1966 amendment 
to Rule 65 giving the district courts express authority to consolidate. 
Second, it examines the 1966 amendment to Rule 65 which added sub­
division (a)(2). \0 Third, the article discusses the consolidation cases 
decided after the 1966 amendment to determine what, if any, changes 
6. Id. 
7. Id. (citing Industrial Bank of Washington v. Tobriner, 405 F.2d 1321, 1324 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1953». 
8. Id. 
9. We exclude from the category of "de facto" consolidation two other types of 
cases: (a) those decisions in which the court purports not to be reaching the merits, but 
could reasonably be accused of doing so; see, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Jones, 846 
F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1988) (Wilkins, J., concurring and dissenting); Paris v. Dep't of Hous. 
and Urban Dev., 843 F.2d 561 (1st Cir. 1988) (Bownes, J., dissenting); Midway Mfg. Co. v. 
Artic Int'l, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); and (b) those deci­
sions in which the court states or assumes that the lower court reached the merits when 
reasonable persons could disagree with that assumption, see, e.g., Firefighters Local Union 
No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 593 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
10. For the text of Rule 65(a)(2), see supra note 2. 
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it wrought in the law of consolidation. It concludes with suggestions 
for changing current law. 
II. PRE-AMENDMENT PRACTICE 
Prior to the 1966 amendments to Rule 65, the federal courts ap~ 
peared to take two contrary approaches to the question of whether the 
court could address the merits of a case after only a hearing on motion 
for a preliminary injunction. Imprecise language and irreconcilable 
holdings in Supreme Court cases largely caused the confusion. One 
line of cases authorized the federal courts to enter final judgment 
(either for plaintiff or defendant) after a preliminary hearing, while the 
other line appeared to prohibit it. Each line of decision will be dis­
cussed in turn. 
A. Court may decide the merits 
Two vintage Supreme Court decisions began this line of prece­
dent. In Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works,l1 the Court affirmed a judgment 
of the court of appeals, which reversed a temporary injunction re­
straining a patent infringement, and ordered the case dismissed on the 
merits. Relying on English and state practice, the Court justified the 
dismissal as saving the parties "needless expense"12 if the case were 
remanded for a trial on the merits. 
Three years later in Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 13 the 
Court limited the rule in Smith to cases where the trial court in fact 
held "a full hearing,"14 rather than the abbreviated hearing usually 
accompanying motions for preliminary injunctions. At the same time, 
the Court expanded the rule to include cases: (1) where the bill is "de­
void of equity"15 on its face; (2) where the claim is "manifestly"16 
without merit; and (3) where the facts are not in dispute. 17 In any of 
these instances, the appellate court might resolve the case on the mer­
its in defendant's favor even though the case arose on motion for a 
preliminary injunction. IS 
In 1903, the Supreme Court characterized the practice an­
nounced in Mast, Foos as the rule and the three limitations as the "ex­
11. 165 U.S. 518(1897). 
12. Vulcan, 165 U.S. at 524. 
13. 177 U.S. 485 (1900). 
14. Mast, Foos, 177 U.S. at 494. 
15. Id. at 495. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Accord, Castner v. Coffman, 178 U.S. 168 (1900). 
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ceptions."19 Despite that analysis, the Court acknowledged the 
difficulties confronting the complainant at a hearing on a motion for 
preliminary relief. The complainant cannot effectively challenge the 
defendant's evidence since one cannot cross-examine an affidavit, the 
usual mode of proof at hearings for preliminary injunctions. The 
Court further recognized that equity complainants should not be re­
quired to put on their whole case when seeking only preliminary relief. 
If they were, "very few motions of that sort would be made."20 While 
that recognition of the realities of hearings for preliminary relief could 
have undermined the Mast, Foos rule, the Court nonetheless adhered 
to it in later cases.21 Indeed the Court expanded the rule again a few 
years later by permitting appellate courts to address the merits if the 
preliminary injunction would cause "grave detriment to the public 
interest."22 
When the courts have applied the Mast, Foos rule, the result has 
generally been a dismissal of the plaintiff's suit with entry ofjudgment 
for the defendant. The question arises whether the courts, after a pre­
liminary hearing, may apply Mast, Foos against the defendant, enter­
ing judgment on the merits for the plaintiff. Despite a contrary 
suggestion by the Supreme Court,23 the federal courts have expanded 
the Mast, Foos rule to permit entry of judgment for the plaintiff after a 
hearing on motion for a preliminary injunction.24 Indeed within seven 
19. Brill v. Peckham Motor Truck and Wheel Co., 189 U.S. 57, 63 (I903). 
20. Id. at 63. 
21. Accord, Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940); Myers v. 
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Meccano, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, 
253 U.S. 136 (1920); Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co. v. Rowe, 245 U.S. 275 (1917); Leeds & Catlin 
Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 301 (I909); Harriman v. Northern Sec. Co., 197 
U.S. 244 (1905). See also Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123 (1913) (extending 
to the Supreme Court the rule permitting the circuit court of appeals to reach the merits on 
appeal from a deicison regarding a preliminary injunction). Contra, Ex parte National 
Enameling and Stamping Co., 201 U.S. 156 (1906) (Supreme Court cannot reach the merits 
unless the circuit court of appeals does). 
22. United States v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 225 U.S. 306, 326 (1912). Accord, Youngs­
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (I952) (President Truman's unsuccessful 
attempt to seize the steel mills during the Korean conflict); National Ass'n of Farmworkers 
Orgs. v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Kansas ex rei. Stephan v. Adams, 
608 F.2d 861, 867 n.5 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Spannaus v. Goldschmidt, 
445 U.S. 963 (1980). 
23. See Meccano, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1920). But see 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (I952). In both Sawyer and Thorn­
burgh, the Supreme Court, in reviewing rulings on preliminary injunctions, reached the 
merits of the disputes and held for the plaintiffs without further discussion. 
24. Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. Lopeno Gas Co., 240 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1957); 
Allegheny Oil Co. v. Snyder, \06 F. 764 (6th Cir. 1900), cert. denied, 181 U.S. 618 (1901). 
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months of the decision in Mast, Foos, the Sixth Circuit, in Allegheny 
Oil Co. v. Snyder,25 upheld the entry of a permanent injunction after 
only a hearing on motion for a temporary26 injunction. In Snyder, the 
plaintiff sued to enforce a contract for leasing land to drill for oil and 
gas. Because "the facts were substantially undisputed,"27 the appellate 
court sustained the judgment for the plaintiff. In such instances, the 
trial court may reach the merits to save the parties "the expense and 
delay of protracted litigation."28 
B. Court may not decide the merits 
Despite this plethora of precedent, the Supreme Court has from 
time to time read Mast, Foos in a more limited fashion. 29 Occasion­
ally, the Court has intimated a disapproval of entering judgment on 
the merits prior to a full hearing in the trial court.30 Finally, in Mayo 
v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co. ,31 the Court appeared to condemn 
altogether the practice of granting judgment for either party before a 
full hearing is conducted. In Mayo, grapefruit processing companies 
sued Florida state officials to enjoin the enforcement of a statute set­
ting prices for citrus fruits. A three-judge district court,32 after hear­
ing, entered a temporary injunction, holding the statute 
unconstitutional. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the 
Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (The Supreme Court, on 
review of a grant of a preliminary injunction, reached the merits of the dispute and held for 
the plaintiffs without further discussion.) See also Hurwitz v. Directors Guild of America, 
Inc., 364 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.) (decided two weeks after the effective date 9f the addition of 
subdivision (a)(2) to Rule 65, the court characterized the issue as one of first impression), 
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966). 
25. 106 F. 764 (6th Cir, 1900), cert. denied, 181 U.S. 618 (1901). 
26. Over the years, the courts have used the words "temporary," "preliminary," "in­
terlocutory," and "provisional" to describe interim injunctive relief. This article will use 
these words interchangeably. . 
27. Snyder, 106 F. at 770. 
28. Id. 
29. Mewino, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1920) (Mast. Foos 
applies only "if it clearly appears that no ground exists for equitable relief"); Eagle Glass & 
Mfg. Co. v. Rowe, 245 U.S. 275, 280-81 (1917) (Mast, Foos applies only if parties consent 
to a disposition on the merits or if there is no basis for equitable relief on the face of the 
complaint). 
30. Ex parte National Enameling and Stamping Co., 201 U.S. 156 (1906); Brill v. 
Peckham Motor Truck and Wheel Co., 189 U.S. 57 (1903). 
31. 309 U.S. 310 (1940). 
32. In 1976, Congress essentially repealed the three-judge district court mechanism. 
Act of August 12, 1976,90 Stat. 1119. See generally HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1333-37 (3d ed. 1988). Congress left the mechanism 
in place for apportionment cases, and for certain other matters. Id. at 1334-35 (citing 28 
U.S.C. § 2284). 
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judgment, stating that the lower court should not have reached the 
merits on the abbreviated record of the preliminary hearing. It should 
only have addressed the factors relating to the propriety of entering a 
preliminary injunction. 
Prior to the 1966 amendments to Rule 65, discussed below, some 
lower federal courts took the Mayo approach. In Progress Develop­
ment Corp. v. Mitchell,33 for example, the plaintiff companies brought 
suit to enjoin town officials from interfering with the construction of 
racially integrated housing. In reversing the district judge's entry of 
summary judgment for the defendant after a hearing on the plaintiff's 
motion for preliminary relief, the court of appeals broadly disapproved 
of the practice of reaching the merits on motion for such relief. "No 
plaintiff is required to prove his case on the merits at a preliminary 
hearing."34 The court stated that the purpose of the abbreviated hear­
ing would be defeated if the court addressed the merits since the par­
ties would be required to present their whole case.35 
III. PosT-AMENDMENT PRACTICE 
On February 28, 1966, the Supreme Court transmitted to Con­
gress amendments to Rule 65, to become effective on July 1, 1966.36 
Among other changes, those amendments added a new subdivision 
(a)(2). This provision authorized the trial judge to consolidate the 
hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction with the trial on 
the merits. In one sense it merely codified in the civil rules a practice 
that the Supreme Court had condoned without subdivision (a)(2) at 
least since the decision in ¥ast, Foos.J7 The question then is - what 
impact, if any, has the new subdivision had on prior practice? The 
impact has been mixed. The cases can be classified into two catego­
ries: (a) decisions under Rule 65(a)(2); and (b) decisions outside the 
rule. Each group will be examined in turn. 
33. 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961). 
34. Id. at 233. 
35. Accord, Di Giorgio v. Causey, 488 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1973); Hoffritz v. United 
States, 240 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1956); Seagram-Distillers Corp: v. New Cut Rate Liquors, 
221 F.2d 815 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 828 (1955); Doeskin Prods. v. United Paper 
Co., 195 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1952); Chicago Great W. Ry. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 193 
F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1952); cf Tanner Motor Livery v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 821 (1963). 
36. Amendments to Rules o/Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 228 (1966). 
37. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485 (1900); see also Smith v. 
Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518 (1897). 
216 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:209 
A. Decisions under Rule 65(a)(2) 
1. History of the Rule 
We begin with a brief explanation of how the rule operates. Rule 
65(a)(2)38 allows the district court to consolidate the hearing on a pre­
liminary injunction with the trial on the merits. In effect this means 
that the preliminary hearing becomes the final trial. According to the 
Advisory Committee's Note, "[t]he subdivision is believed to reflect 
the substance of the best current practice and introduces no novel con­
ception."39 Unfortunately, the Advisory Committee's Note makes no 
reference to any prior judicial decision or other authority to support 
its assertion as to "the best current practice." In fact, as noted above, 
the federal courts had taken at least two different approaches. Nor 
does the Note explain why one approach is "best." 
The purpose of the amendment was to achieve judicial economy 
and efficiency where desirable and appropriate. The courts of appeals 
have encouraged the use of consolidation under Rule 65(a)(2) to ad­
vance the decision on the merits of the controversy and to save time 
and expense both at the trial and appellate levels.40 A court using the 
rule can avoid repetition of evidence when the evidence on the prelimi­
nary injunction motion will also be important to a decision on the 
merits.41 
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
thought that such simultaneous consideration of the application for 
preliminary relief and of final judgment would provide the party seek­
ing relief with a speedier overall remedy.42 However, the consolidated 
proceeding should not, in theory at least, cause any "delay in the dis­
position of the application for the preliminary injunction, for the evi­
dence will be directed in the first instance to that relief, and the 
preliminary injunction, if justified by the proof, may be issued in the 
course of the consolidated proceedings. "43 
38. For the text of Rule 65(a)(2), see supra note 2. 
39. Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District 
Courts, 39 F.R.D. 73, 124 (1966). 
40. E.g., West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987); Forts v. Ward, 566 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1977); Glen-Arden 
Commodities v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027, 1030 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974). 
41. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Fed­
eral Rules of Civil Procedure (II), 81 HARV. L. REV. 591, 609-10 (1968). 
42. Proposed Amendments to Rules, supra note 39, at 124. 
43. Id. 
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2. Timing 
Rule 65(a)(2) allows the court to order consolidation at any time 
"[b]efore or after the commencement" of the hearing on a motion for 
preliminary relief.44 Many judges have interpreted this to mean that 
they can consolidate at the end of the hearing as well.45 In addition 
some courts have read the rule to give them the power to consolidate 
retroactively.46 That is, after the hearing has concluded, the district 
court enters a consolidation order that relates back to the preliminary 
hearing and the full trial is merged with the hearing. 
In effect, the trial on the merits never takes place because the 
consolidation occurs at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing and 
effectively bars a trial. This procedure would seem to be in violation of 
the spirit of the rule, and "comes perilously close to a violation of due 
process."47 The courts, however, have not held such action to be a per 
se violation of Rule 65(a)(2). Rather, they balance the trial court's 
discretionary power against the degree of prejudice to the complaining 
party.48 
3. By motion or own initiative 
Consolidation can be ordered by the court on its own initiative49 
or by request of either party for such an order. 50 The judge's discre­
tion is broad. 51 If consolidation is ordered, Rule 65(a)(2) allows evi­
dence already introduced at the hearing to be incorporated in the 
record at the trial on the merits. It does not preclude the parties from 
44. FED. R. CIv. P. 65(a)(2). 
45. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988); American Fed'n of Gov't 
Employees v. Colburn, 531 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1976). 
46. Kg., Wohlfahrt v. Memorial Medical Center, 658 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. Unit A 
Oct. 1981) (district court denied preliminary hearing on motion for a preliminary injunc­
tion); Warehouse Groceries Management v. Sav-U-Warehouse Groceries, 624 F.2d 655 
(5th Cir. 1980) (district court denied preliminary relief, issued order consolidating hearing 
and trial, and issued final relief); see Update Art v. Modiin Publishing, 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 
1988). 
47. Gellman v. Maryland, 538 F.2d 603, 606 (4th Cir. 1976). 
48. Wohlfahrt, 658 F.2d at 417-18; Dry Creek Lodge v. United States, 515 F.2d 926 
(10th Cir. 1975); Nationwide Amusements v. Nattin, 452 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1971) (per 
curiam) (Fifth Circuit case reported as Fourth Circuit case in Federal Reporter); see John­
son v. White, 528 F.2d 1228 (2d Cir. 1975); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, 460 F.2d 
1096, 1106-07 (5th Cir. 1972). 
49. See Northern Arapahoe Tribe v. Hodel, 808 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1987). 
50. K. SINCLAIR, FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 387 (2d ed. 1986). 
51. See Glacier Park Foundation v. Watt, 663 F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 1981) 
("[C]ourt has the power to consolidate .... Such action may be taken by stipulation, 
motion, or even sua sponte so long as the procedures do not result in prejudice to either 
party."); Dillon v. Bay City Constr. Co., 512 F.2d 801, 804 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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reintroducing evidence or testimony at trial if "finer details of proof 
are needed on trial than on the preliminary injunction."52 
4. Notice 
The rule does not specify what kind of notice, if any, is required 
as a prerequisite for consolidation. Consequently, the courts have de­
veloped their own standards. Although not unanimous in their ap­
proach, they generally have embraced a three-step inquiry. First, has 
the district court given any notice at all of its intent to consolidate and 
reach the merits? Second, if so, is that notice adequate or sufficient? 
Third, if no notice or inadequate notice has been given, has a party (or 
parties) been prejudiced by the absence of notice? Some courts have 
added a fourth step: Would the omitted evidence change the result of 
the decision below? 
Although there is no requirement of a formal, written notice of 
consolidation,53 "clear and unambiguous notice"54 of the court's in­
tention to consolidate must be given. The Supreme Court has adopted 
this standard. 55 Thus, a party has grounds to object if it received no 
notice or if the notice was inadequate. Most commentators believe 
that notice should be adequate so that the parties may present their 
respective cases fairly and fully. 56 The focus of "adequate notice"57 is 
whether the objecting party has had the opportunity to develop and 
present its case. In determining the adequacy of notice, the courts 
have considered the period of time between the notice and the consoli­
dated hearing, 58 the nature of the case,59 the words used by the judge 
52. Kaplan, supra note 41, at 610. 
53. H & w Industries v. Formosa Plastics Corp:, USA, 860 F.2d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 
1988); Nationwide Amusements v. Nattin, 452 F.2d 651,652 (5th Cir. 1971) (!fer curiam) 
(Fifth Circuit case reported as Fourth Circuit case in Federal Reporter). 
54. Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 
1972). Accord, Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988); Proimos v. Fair 
Automotive Repair, 808 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1987). 
55. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). 
56. See 19 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION 478 (1983); WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 3, at 486. 
57. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 337 (9th Cir. 1988). 
58. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988); Northern ArapahoeTribe 
v. Hodel, 808 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1987); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Board of 
Trade, 657 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1981); GeHman v. Maryland, 538 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1976). 
59. Without belaboring the obvious, a litigant may need more time to prepare for 
trial "in a complicated case" Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 337 (9th Cir. 1988), 
than in one less astounding. Compare Michenfelder (five weeks is sufficient time in a pris­
oner's suit chaHenging strip searches and use of taser guns) with H & W Industries v. 
Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 860 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1988) (six weeks of discovery is 
insufficient time to prepare a breach of contract and antitrust suit). 
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purporting to consolidate,60 the opportunity or plans of the party to 
undertake discovery,61 and other related factors. The adequacy of the 
notice "must be evaluated in light of whether the plaintiff [or defend­
ant] would have used the additional time productively."62 Where the 
district court entered the consolidation order after the preliminary 
hearing and during oral argument, the Fourth Circuit found error. 63 
If the objecting party has not received any notice of the court's 
intent to decide the merits after a preliminary hearing (so-called "de 
facto consolidation"64), or if the notice is inadequate, the courts are 
divided as to whether that alone constitutes reversible error. 
Although the Supreme Court did not address this point in 
Camenisch,65 the lower federal courts have regularly dealt with the 
issue, reaching different conclusions. Some courts have adopted the 
automatic reversal approach.66 In Puerto Rican Farm Workers ex rei. 
Vidal v. Eatmon,67 for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed a judgment denying the plaintiff a permanent injunction after 
a hearing on its motion for preliminary relief because the district court 
failed to notify the plaintiff of its intent to reach the merits. It held 
that, under Rule 65(a)(2), the plaintiff is entitled to notice and a trial 
on the merits. Courts have reached this result even where the prelimi­
nary hearing has produced an extensive record. 68 
Similarly, where the district court fails to provide adequate no­
tice, some courts have reversed a merit judgment without any showing 
of prejudice. In Gellman v. Maryland,69 it was enough that the plain­
·60. E.g., Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 
(7th Cir. 1972) (inadequate notice of preliminary hearing to "complete" its "total case" 
before resting). 
61. Northern Arapahoe Tribe v. Hodel, 808 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1987); Gellman v. 
Maryland, 538 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1976); Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 
463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972). 
62. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 337 (9th Cir. 1988). 
63. 'Gellman v. Maryland, 538 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1976). 
64. Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen v. Pacific Fruit Express Co., 651 F.2d 651, 653 (9th 
Cir. 1981). 
65. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390,395 (1981). 
66. Woe by Woe v. Cuomo, 801 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1986); Crowley v. Local No. 82, 
679 F.2d 978, 998 n.23 (1st Cir. 1982) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 526 
(1984); Gellman v. Maryland, 538 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1976); Penn v. San Juan Hosp., 528 
F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1975); Puerto Rican Farm Workers ex rei. Vidal v. Eatmon, 427 F.2d 
210 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970). See also 
Proimos v. Fair Automotive Repair, 808 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1987). 
67. 427 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). 
68., Woe by Woe v. Cuomo, 801 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1986); West Publishing Co. v. 
Mead Data Cent., 799 F.2d 1219, 1229-30 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. deIJied, 479 U.S. 1070 
(1987). 
69. 538 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1976). 
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tiff had additional evidence to offer and had been denied the opportu­
nity to engage in discovery after the preliminary hearing. The court of 
appeals refused to assess the kind and quality of evidence the plaintiff 
might later introduce at a merits trial. 
In contrast, other courts have held that, even if the district judge 
consolidates without any notice or without adequate notice, this will 
not result in automatic reversal. Although courts have stated that the 
better or preferred practice is for the district court to give notice70 and 
to place the response of the parties on the record,11 they have not re­
quired it. If the facts are undisputed based on the existing record, if . 
the case involves only a question of law, or if the complaining party 
fails to show prejudice, the appellate court will affirm the judgment on 
the merits even though there has been no trial. First, with regard to 
undisputed facts, the Eighth Circuit, in United States ex reI. Goldman 
v. Meredith,n found that the preliminary hearing record disclosed "no 
conflict of material fact"73 and, thus, entry of final judgment for the 
defendant was appropriate even though the plaintiff had not received 
adequate notice. Second, the courts have not required notice when the 
dispute concerns exclusively questions of law.74 . 
Third, if the complaining party fails to demonstrate "prejudice," 
the judgment on the merits will be affirmed.75 Some courts require the 
complaining party to demonstrate "substantial prejudice"76 to its case 
caused by the inadequate notice of consolidation. To show prejudice, 
the objecting party must prove "how additional evidence could have 
70. E.g., United States ex reI. Goldman v. Meredith, 596 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Goldman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 444 U.S. 838 (1979); 
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. FfC, 546 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977). 
71. Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974); Pughs­
ley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972). 
72. 596 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Goldman v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 444 U.S. 838 (1979). 
73. Id. at 1358. 
74. Brotherhood ofRy. Carmen v. Pacific Fruit Express Co., 651 F.2d 651, 653 (9th 
Cir. 1981). 
75. E.g., Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988); H & W Industries v. 
Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 860 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1988); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Goshen 
County Coop. Beet Growers Ass'n, 725 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1984); Paris v. United States 
Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 713 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1983); Commodity Futures Trad­
ing Comm'n v. Board of Trade, 657 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1981); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. 
FfC, 546 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, 460 F.2d 1096 
(5th Cir. 1972); Nationwide Amusements v. Nattin, 452 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1971) (per 
curiam) (Fifth Circuit case reported as Fourth Circuit case in Federal Reporter). 
76. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 337 (9th Cir. 1988); Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Generix Drug Sales, 460 F.2d 1096, 1105 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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altered the outcome."77 Thus the objecting party must show what evi­
dence would have been introduced at trial,78 or what additional dis­
covery was required in order for it to p~t on its complete case.79 In 
short, the complaining party must show that it was denied "a full and 
complete hearing."8o 
Some courts have added a fourth step. In these cases, the appel­
late courts evaluate the sufficiency of the additional evidence or dis­
covery against the standard for rendering judgment on the merits.8! If 
the additional "proffered evidence"82 is not sufficient to carry the bur­
den of proof required to overturn the trial decision, the error is 
deemed to be harmless because a remand would be "a useless 
gesture."83 
5. Consent and waiver 
The courts have also reached the merits of a controversy after a 
preliminary injunction hearing, without formal consolidation under 
Rule 65(a)(2), in two additional circumstances: (1) when the parties 
consent to the court deciding the merits; and (2) when they waive the 
right to notice and opportunity to be heard further on the merits. Nu­
merous decisions have noted that formal consolidation is unnecessary 
if the parties expressly consent to the district court combining the pre­
liminary hearing with the trial. 84 
Similarly, courts have found waiver based on the behavior of the 
complaining party or parties. Such waiver may occur when the com­
plaining party: (1) fails to object when the district judge in fact con­
77. Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 337. 
78. Rosenthal v. Carr, 614 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 927 (1980). 
79. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988) (district court ordered 
consolidation five weeks before trial and seven weeks after the action commenced; addi­
tional time would not have helped the plaintiff prepare any more thoroughly). Compare 
Paris v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 713 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(judge consolidated just before adjourning the preliminary hearing, thus cutting short 
plaintiff's discovery). 
80. H & W Industries v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 860 F.2d 172, 178 (5th Cir. 
1988). 
81. Reese Publishing Co. v. Hampton Int'l Communications, 620 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
82. Berry v. Bean, 796 F.2d 713, 719 (4th Cir. 1986). See also Socialist Workers 
Party v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 566 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (after the 
defendant's evidentiary hearing, court found that such facts would not alter the result), 
aff'd 440 U.S. 173 (1979). 
83. Berry v. Bean, 796 F.2d 713, 719 (4th Cir. 1986). 
84. Proimos v. Fair Automotive Repair, 808 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1987); Pughsley v. 
3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972); Puerto Rican Farm 
Workers ex reL Vidal v. Eatmon, 427 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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solidates in the presence of the parties;85 or (2) files a post-hearing 
brief and proposed order which assume a disposition on the merits. 86 
Finally, in Channel Home Centers v. Grossman,87 the plaintiff objected 
to the district court's failure to give advance notice of consolidation. 
When the judge offered to permit the plaintiff to introduce additional 
evidence at a second hearing, the plaintiff declined because it first 
wanted more discovery. The court of appeals held that this consti­
tuted a waiver of any defect under Rule 65(a)(2) because the plaintiff 
never asked for additional discovery or more time to prepare. 
6. Jury trial 
The rule also protects the parties' right to jury trial. It directs 
that "subdivision (a)(2) shall be so construed and applied as to save to 
the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury."88 Thus, when a 
party requests a jury trial, evidence already heard at the hearing may 
be reintroduced for the benefit of the jury, even if repetitious, because 
reading the record from the preliminary hearing to the jury may not 
be realistic.89 Often critical testimony of prior witnesses may require 
that the jury observe the demeanor of the witness in order to deter­
mine how much weight to give the testimony. 
The parties will probably also want to reintroduce evidence 
presented in affidavits and depositions at the hearing after consolida­
tion takes place. Similarly, if the consolidated trial is to be held before 
a different judge, the parties have the right to reintroduce evidence 
presented at the hearing.9o Finally, after consolidation, the party who 
has demanded a jury trial may inadvertently lose that right since the 
court is now hearing the case on the merits without a jury.91 Courts 
85. DeLeon v. Susquehanna Community School Dist., 747 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1984); 
Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974). 
86. Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974); see Paris 
v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 713 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1983). But cf. 
Woe by Woe v. Cuomo, 801 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1986) (plaintiff's request for a permanent 
injunction in its post-hearing brief does not constitute a waiver by defendant). 
87. 795 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986). See National Ass'n of Farmworkers Orgs. v. Mar­
shall, 628 F.2d 604, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (parties consented on appeal to a decision on the 
merits); cf. United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1519 n.21 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(parties did not consent on appeal to consolidating preliminary relief with merits). Contra, 
Di Giorgio v. Causey, 488 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1973) (parties' agreement on appeal to reach 
merits is not sufficient basis for court to do so); Doeskin Prods. v. United Paper Co., 195 
F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1952) (same). 
88. FED. R. CIv. P. 65(a)(2) (last sentence). 
89. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 36, at 122. 
90. Id. 
91. Cf. Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961). 
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have been quite sensitive to this concern, and have reversed merits 
judgments that appeared to trench upon a litigant's right to jury 
trial.92 The remedy is for the court to revoke the consolidation order, 
postponing the trial on the merits, or to impanel a jury to find the 
facts. . 
7. Continuance 
The rule is silent about continuance and time for additional dis­
covery. Parties involved in preliminary injunction hearings are usu­
ally rushed by the need to prepare for the hearing. Thus, 
consolidation may work a real hardship if the judge is unwilling to 
grant additional time for discovery and case development. In some 
instances the trial judge has told the parties they must put on their full 
cases immediately and has denied requests for additional time for 
discovery.93 
8. Summary judgment 
In other instances, courts have used rulings in the nature of sum­
mary judgment whereby plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunc­
tion is denied and other legal or equitable relief prayed for is also 
denied or granted.94 When district courts do this, they are not afford­
iQg the parties the procedural safeguards of either motions to dismiss 
under Rule 12 or summary judgment under Rule 56.95 In one case, a 
judge even fashioned permanent relief after the close of the prelimi­
nary injunction hearing while the case was on appea1.96 He did so 
based on the hearing record, pleadings, and affidavits. He .simply or­
dered the parties to court, informed them that he had consolidated, 
and issued his final order on the merits.97 
92. H & W Industries v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 860 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1988); 
Proimos v. Fair Automotive Repair, 808 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1987); Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Generix Drug Sales, 460 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1972). 
93. Pughsley v. 3750 Lakeshore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972). 
94. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975). 
95. Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b) and motions for summary judgment under 
Rule 56 are ordinarily made in writing prior to a hearing. FED. R. CIv. P. 7(b). The 
federal rules generally require five days notice of the hearing on the motion. FED. R. CIv. 
P. 6(d). If the motion is for summary judgment, ten days notice is required. FED. R. CIv. 
P. 56(c). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment may obtain discovery if 
needed to prepare counter-affidavits. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f). 
96. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, 460 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1972). 
97. Id. at 1096. 
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B. Decisions Outside Rule 65(a)(2) 
Analytically, the "consolidation" decisions under and outside 
Rule 65(a)(2) raise identical concerns regarding the disposition of 
cases on the merits after only an abbreviated hearing on a motion for 
preliminary relief. Despite the addition of subdivision (a)(2) to Rule 
65 in 1966, the federal courts continue to decide cases on the merits, 
without reference to Rule 65(a)(2), after only a preliminary hearing. 
These decisions outside the rule probably persist in the jurispru­
dence of injunction law because (1) they trace their history to prece­
dents antedating by at least sixty years the amendment tQ Rule 65; and 
(2) they arise largely, although not entirely, in the appellate courts 
hearing appeals from judgments granting or denying preliminary in­
junctions. Although Rule 65(a)(2) is technically applicable only in the 
United States district courts,98 the concerns underlying the rule should 
guide the appellate courts as well. In an analogous context, the 
Supreme Court has noted: "Although the Federal Rules of Civil Pro­
cedure strictly apply only in the district courts ... the policies inform­
ing [them] may apply equally to the courts of appeals."99 Indeed the 
Supreme Court has on occasion applied the civil rules to cases before 
it. 100 
Like their counterparts prior to the Rule 65 amendment, the deci­
sions after the amendment take two disparate approaches. One line of 
cases, which dates at least to Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning 
Co. ,101 appears to prohibit decisions on the merits after only a prelimi­
nary hearing. The second line of precedents, permitting such "de 
facto consolidation," is more hoary, dating to cases decided at the tum 
of the century. 102 
The progeny of Mayo are numerous in the post-1966 period. 
Although the courts do not always refer specifically to Mayo, they 
nonetheless faithfully apply its rationale. The essence of Mayo is that 
the parties at a hearing on motion for preliminary relief do not have 
sufficient time or opportunity to prepare their cases fully. Such hear­
ings are regularly conducted on the papers, including affidavits, depo­
sitions, exhibits, and other documentary proof.. The inability to 
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
99. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 109 S. Ct. 2218, 2223 (1989) (in fact 
the Court approved the application of those precise policies in the court of appeals). 
100. Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952) (applicability of Rule 21 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to cases pending in the Supreme Court). 
101. 309 U.S. 310 (1940). See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. 
102. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485 (1900); Smith v. Vulcan 
Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518 (1897). 
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conduct extensive discovery is another limiting factor. The abbrevi­
ated nature of the proceeding makes it a poor vehicle for exploring the 
merits of the controversy. Thus, it is not surprising that in Withrow v. 
Larkin 103 the Supreme Court chastised a lower federal court for de­
claring a state statute unconstitutional after only a preliminary hear­
ing. While relying on Mayo, the Court did not refer either to Rule 
65(a)(2) or the Mast, FODs line. 
A few years later, the Supreme Court, even more emphatically, 
underscored the importance of not deciding the merits solely on the 
basis of a hearing on motion for preliminary relief. In 1981 the Court 
decided University of Texas v. Camenisch,I04 which in some respects 
represents the intersection of the rule and non-rule lines of decision. 
Camenisch, a deaf college student, commenced a civil action against 
the University of Texas under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973.105 He claimed that the University violated the Act because it 
refused to pay for a sign language interpreter. The plaintiff moved for 
and the district court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the 
University to pay for an interpreter until a decision on the merits. 
While the case was on appeal from the grant of the injunction, 
Camenisch graduated from the University. As a consequence, he 
claimed in the Supreme Court that the case was moot, while the de­
fendant asserted it was still alive because Camenisch had posted a 
$3,000 bond as a condition of the preliminary injunction. In effect the 
defendant was asking the Court to address the merits of the dispute to 
determine if Camenisch should be liable under the bond for its pay­
ments to the interpreter. 
The Supreme Court agreed with Cameni~ch that the case was 
moot, but only as to the propriety of the preliminary injunction. It 
held that the security bond for the injunction operated to keep the 
merits alive, but not the preliminary relief. The Court stated, how­
ever, that "it is generally inappropriate for a federal court at the pre­
liminary-injunction stage to give a final judgment on the merits."106 
103. 421 U.S. 35 (1975). See also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814-26 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Walters v. Na­
tional Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 338-58 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561,601-04 (1984) (B1ackmun, J., 
dissenting); Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 457 (1973) ("this Court may only consider" the 
matters going to the issuance of the preliminary injunction). 
104. 451 U.S. 390 (1981). Of course, the doctrinal antecedent of Camenisch goes 
back at least to Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310 (1940). See supra 
notes 31-35 and accompanying text. The Court never cited Mayo in Camenisch. 
105. 29 U.S.c. § 794 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
106. Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395. See also Thornburgh v. American College of Ob­
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Because of the limited purpose and nature of the preliminary hearing, 
a party "is not required to prove his case in flJll" 107 at that stage of the 
proceedings. The Court noted, however, that consolidation proce­
dures under Rule 65(a)(2) authorize the district court judge to com­
bine the preliminary hearing with a trial on the merits, suggesting that 
approach as the exclusive mode of proceeding. A number of lower 
federal courts have followed this line of reasoning. !Os 
In contrast with the Larkin-Camenisch line is the other group of 
precedents in which the Supreme Court and other federal courts have 
reached the merits although the cases arose on motions for prelimi­
nary relief. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gy­
necologists 109 is the leading case after the 1966 amendment adding 
subdivision (a)(2) to Rule 65. In Thornburgh the plaintiffs challenged 
the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act. The 
district court issued very limited preliminary relief, which the Court of 
Appeals expanded considerably in holding major portions of the stat­
ute unconstitutional. 
Without any reference to Rule 65(a)(2), the Supreme Court held 
that appellate courts (and logically trial courts as well) may dispose of 
a case on the merits even though the record was developed on motion 
for a preliminary injunction. The Court stated that the normal rule 
articulated in Camenisch is not "inflexible" 110 or a limitation on "judi­
cial power,"lll Courts may address the merits if the case rests 
"solely" on questions of law and if "the facts are established or of no 
stetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814-26 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Wai­
ters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 338-58 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 601-04 (1984) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 457 (1973) ("this Court may 
only consider" the matters going to the issuance of the preliminary injunction). 
107. Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395. 
108. Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236 (1st Cir. 1986) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987); Thournir v. Buchanan, 710 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1983); 
West Point-Pepperell v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 953 n.l (11th Cir. 1982); Brooks v. 
Nacrelli, 415 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1969). 
109. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). See also Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 
473 U.S. 305 (1985); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984). 
110. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 756. Two years before Thornburgh, the Court of Ap­
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated that Camenisch was not "an insurmounta­
ble bar" to an appellate court deciding the merits on review of a preliminary injunction 
motion. West Virginia Ass'n of Community Health Centers v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1570, 
1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
111. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 757. See Mercury Motor Express v. Brinke, 475 F.2d 
1086, 1091 (5th Cir. 1973) (rule limiting appellate review to issues of the preliminary in­
junction, not the merits, "is one of orderly judicial administration and not a limit on juris­
dictional power"). See also Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 
(1985). 
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controlling relevance."112 Relying on the Smith 113 and Sawyerl14 de­
cisions, the Court stated that such a practice is calculated "to save the 
parties the expense of further litigation." 115 
In a sharp and vigorous dissent, Justice O'Connor,116 relying on 
Camenisch, criticized the majority for prematurely deciding "serious 
constitutional questions on an inadequate record."ll7 In Thornburgh, 
she noted, the district court conducted the usual abbreviated hearing 
for preliminary relief, consisting of affidavits, stipulated facts, oral ar­
gument, and legal memoranda. Justice O'Connor complained that the 
defendants did not have the opportunity "to develop facts that might 
have a bearing on the constitutionality of the statute."1l8 The defend­
ants, she observed, stipulated to facts in the district court only for the 
purpose of the decision on the preliminary injunction motion. If the 
majority view prevails, she stated, future parties will convert the pre­
liminary hearing into a full trial on the merits for fear that the court 
will decide the merits without giving adequate opportunity to present 
their entire case. This will make litigation "more expensive, less relia­
ble, and less fair.""9 
112. Thornburgh, 476 u.s. at 757. 
113. Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518 (1897). Reliance on Smith is some­
what misplaced since the Court itself has described Smith as having been decided after "a 
full hearing ... upon pleadings and proofs." "Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 
U.S. 485, 494 (1900). As Justice O'Connor pointed out dissenting in Thornburgh, the dis­
trict court did not conduct a full hearing in the Thornburgh case. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 
815-26. 
114. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Reliance on 
Sawyer may also be misplaced since that case arose under "highly unusual circumstances," 
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 822 (O'Connor, J., dissenting): President Truman had seized the 
steel mills, the Government did not object to a merits decision, the steel companies affirma­
tively wanted it, and time was of the essence. 
115. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 756. 
116. Justice O'Connor appears to be the only member of the current Court who has 
taken a consistent position on this issue, whether she is in the majority or in dissent. The 
other justices appear to ignore or embrace Camenisch depending on whether the majority 
of the court accepts or rejects their view on the merits. For example, Justice Blackmun 
essentially ignored Camenisch writing for the majority in Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 755-56, 
but embraced it when dissenting in Stotts, 467 U.S. at 601-04. Similarly, Justice Brennan 
joined Justice Blackmun in Thornburgh, but relied heavily on Camenisch dissenting in WaI­
ters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 338-58 (1985). Justice Rehn­
quist wrote for the Court in Walters, ignoring Camenisch, but embraced it dissenting with 
Justice O'Connor in Thornburgh. Lastly, Justice White, disregarding Camenisch, spoke for 
the majority in Stotts, but adopted Camenisch dissenting in Thornburg. Similar observa­
tions may be made of the other justices by examining their voting patterns in Camenisch, 
Stotts, Walters, and Thornburgh. A foolish consistency, as Emerson once wrote, may very 
well be the hobglobin of little minds and law review articles. 
117. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 815. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 826. 
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Lower federal courts have, like the Thornburgh Court, reached 
the merits of cases after a preliminary heariI)g without regard to Rule 
65(a)(2). They have, however, adopted various approaches to that in­
quiry. The courts have decided the merits in the following circum­
stances: (1) where the dispute, as in Thornburgh, presents only legal 
questions and the facts are not in dispute; 120 (2) where the complaint 
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;121 (3) where 
the record is fully developed, the legal issues are obvious, and immedi­
ate resolution of the merits is needed; 122 and (4) where the record is 
fully developed and the dispute turns largely on legal questions. 123 As 
in the period prior to the amendment to Rule 65(a)(2), the majority of 
cases have involved entry of judgment for the defendant, although a 
few, such as Thornburgh itself, have ruled for the plaintiff on the 
merits. 124 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
A. Introduction 
Although more than two decades have passed since the 1966 
amendment to Rule 65(a)(2) expressly authorized consolidation, con­
fusion over when consolidation is proper still exists. The problems 
identified in this article suggest the need for reform. The following 
proposals are addressed to both trial and appellate practice. They are 
designed to ensure that parties receive notice of consolidation and 
have full opportunity to object. More importantly, they are designed 
to ensure that all parties have a full and fair opportunity to present 
120. West Allis Memorial Hosp. v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1988); Faheem-El 
v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Callaway v. Block, 763 F.2d 1283, 1287 
n.6 (11th Cir. 1985); Otero Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Federal Reserve Bank, 665 F.2d 275 
(10th Cir. 1981); Montano v. Lefkowitz, 575 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1978). See also Socialist 
Workers Party v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 566 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), 
aff'd 440 U.S. 173 (1979). 
121. American Cyanamid Corp. v. Connaught Laboratories, 800 F.2d 306, 310 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (where the claims are "utterly without merit"); Friarton Estates Corp. v. City of 
New York, 681 F.2d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 1982) (where the complaint has "no equity"); 
Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 447 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc) (where there is "no 
merit to the complaint whatever"); Lee v. Ply*Gem Indus., 593 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). 
122. South Carolina ex rei. Tindal v .. Block, 717 F.2d 874 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. de­
nied, 465 U.S. 1080 (1984). 
123. New York v. Lyng, 829 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1987); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 
1376 (9th Cir. 1987). . 
124. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1987); National Ass'n of 
Farmworkers Orgs. v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Hurwitz v. Directors 
Guild of America, 364 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.) (decided two weeks after the effective date of the 
1966 amendment to Rule 65), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966). 
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their case on the merits, either at the preliminary injunction hearing or 
at the trial. We first present current Rule 65(a)(2) followed by a sug­
gested amendment. We then propose a comparable amendment to re­
form appellate practice for the courts of appeals and the Supreme 
Court. 
B. Current Rule 65(a)(2) 
Consolidation of Hearing With Trial on Merits. 
Before or after the commencement of the hearing of an application 
for a preliminary injunction, the court may order the trial of the 
action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hear­
ing of the application. Even when this consolidation is not ordered, 
any evidence received upon an application for a preliminary injunc­
tion which would be admissible upon the trial on the merits be­
comes part of the record on the trial and need not be repeated upon 
the trial. This subdivision (a)(2) shall be so construed and applied 
as to save to the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury. 125 
C. Proposed Amendments 
1. Amendment to Rule 65(a)(2) 
Consolidation of Hearing With Trial on Merits. 
(i) At any time during the pendency of a motion for a prelimi­
nary injunction, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, . 
may order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and 
consolidated with the hearing on the motion. Prior to the entry of 
such order, the court shall give cleat and unambiguous notice of the 
proposed order to every ·party. Unless expressly. waived in open 
court, every party shall be afforded adequate time to object in writ­
ing to the proposed order. The court. may order consolidation only 
if the objecting party has had a full and fair opportunity for discov­
ery and to present to the court the factual and legal materials in 
support of its case on the merits. The court shall enter into the 
record its reasons for ordering ·consolidation. 
(ii) An order consolidating the hearing and trial shall not oper­
ate to delay the granting or denial of preliminary relief. Even when 
consolidation is not ordered, any evidence received upon a motion 
for a preliminary injunction which would be admissible at the trial 
on the merits becomes part of the record for such trial and need not 
be readmitted. 
125. FED. R. elv. P. 65(a)(2). 
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(iii) This subdivision (a)(2) shall be so construed and applied as 
to save to the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury. 
2. Amendment to Appellate Practice126 
Whenever an appeal is taken pursuant to Section 1292(a)(1) or 
otherwise, the court of appeals, upon motion or upon its own initia­
tive, may enter an order stating its intention to decide the case on 
the merits. Prior to the entry of such order, the court shall give 
clear and unambiguous notice of the proposed order to every party 
to the action. Unless expressly waived in open court or in writing, 
every party to the action shall be afforded adequate time to object in 
writing to the proposed order. The court may enter such an order 
only if the objecting party has had a full and fair opportunity to 
present its factual and legal materials in support of its case on the 
merits to the district court or the court of appeals. The court of 
appeals shall enter into the record its reasons for the order. This 
subdivision shall be so construed and applied as to save to the par­
ties any rights they may have to trial by jury. 
D. Discussion 
The proposed changes take into account a number of factors and 
seek to address the apparent reasons for the types of misapplication of 
the current rule discussed above. The most important change is the 
one requiring a court to provide adequate notice to the parties. Re­
quiring that the court provide the parties with clear and unambiguous 
notice of consolidation conforms with the most widely cited standard 
employed by the federal courts of appeals. 127 The proposed amend­
ments adopt this standard of notice because it ensures that the parties 
know what the court contemplates; that is, it ensures that the parties 
understand the procedural setting in which they are operating. Any­
thing more might needlessly hamstring the court. A formal notice re­
quirement, such as one mandating that ten days before consolidation 
takes place the parties be served with a written order, would not serve 
the ends of a preliminary injunction remedy, nor would such a formal 
notice requirement provide the flexibility required to deal with prelim­
inary injunctions. The reason for only requiring that notice be ade­
126. This amendment is proposed as a new subdivision to 28 U'.S.C. § 1292 or as an 
addition to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. A comparable amendment should 
also govern practice in the United States Supreme Court. 
127. See, e.g., Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d \055, \055­
57 (7th Cir. 1972). 
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quate is simply to ensure that the parties know what is expected of 
them in terms of case presentation. 
When it appears to the parties that the notice afforded to them by 
the court does not provide adequate time for full case development 
and presentation, the suggested amendments, which include an ex­
plicit procedure for objection, would provide the protection which is 
now lacking. A party who feels that consolidation will work prejudice 
because of the pressures of obtaining or defending against a prelimi­
nary injunction would have the power to object at this point without 
resorting to additional procedural litigation. A party could request 
time to prepare the objection. Faced with a proposed order of consoli­
dation, a party could object, either orally or in writing, so that the 
district court would know the basis for the objection. 
It must be remembered that it is the trial which is being expe­
dited, and some parties may not have even begun to prepare for trial. 
They may need time for discovery or to find witnesses. Should a party 
come forward and show that consolidation is prejudicial because it 
forces that party to address issues it is not yet prepared to litigate, the 
court should continue to conduct the hearing and wait to consolidate 
at a later time. The proposal allows the court to order consolidation 
over objection but only "if the objecting party has had a full and fair 
opportunity to present to the court the factual and legal materials in 
support of its case on the merits." As a further safeguard against arbi­
trary action, the proposal requires the district judge to "enter into the 
record its reasons for ordering consolidation." 
These provisions should make it clear that any doubts which the 
court may have should be resolved in favor of the objecting party. A 
court should never consolidate after refusing to hear proffered evi­
dence or before inquiring what further evidence a party contemplates 
adducing at trial. The objection provision of the propqsal is intended 
to avoid the problems encountered in a case like Dillon v. Bay City 
Construction Co. 128 where the district court refused to hear new evi­
dence and refused to allow more time for discovery after counsel ob­
jected to consolidation. 129 
The proposed revision would also make it clear to the federal 
courts that retroactive consolidation should never work to deprive 
parties of the opportunity to present their case at trial. Retroactive 
consolidation is, in effect, summary judgment without the procedural 
128. 512 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1975). 
129. Id. at 803. 
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protections of Rule 56. 130 It is premised on the often mistaken belief 
that the issues litigated at a preliminary injunction hearing are identi­
cal to those litigated at the trial. The recognition of the right to object 
should prevent this aberrant form of summary judgment from occur­
ring because courts would have to give notice before deciding the mer­
its. Such a notice requirement avoids the problems found in Woe by 
Woe v. Cuomo, 131 where the defendant held back evidence and, in fact, 
did not put on a case at the hearing because defense counsel expected 
to introduce their case at a trial on the merits. Under the proposed 
amendment, parties whose litigation strategy was to concede the pre­
liminary injunction and resist vigorously the final relief would not find 
themselves surprised by an after-hearing consolidation order coupled 
with final judgment. 
The objection provision, in conjunction with the notice provision, 
allows the court to test its perception of the case against that of the 
parties. This is important because, although the issue at the hearing is 
not the same as at trial, frequently the evidence offered at the prelimi­
nary hearing bears on issues to be decided at trial. The proposed 
amendments would prevent the trial court from losing sight of the fun­
damental difference between issues litigated at a preliminary hearing 
and those litigated at a trial on the merits. \32 For example, in a case 
like Gellman v. Maryland,133 the proposed change could have pre­
vented the prejudice to plaintiff in the trial court by forbidding the 
district judge to consolidate without notice and opportunity to be 
heard by the parties. 
In Gellman, the plaintiff Gellman had obtained a temporary re­
straining order pursuant to Rule 65(b). Gellman was seeking to enjoin 
Morgan State College in Baltimore, Maryland, from engaging in al­
leged acts of racial discrimination. 134 At the conclusion of the hearing 
on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court consoli­
dated the hearing with the trial. \35 Plaintiff's counsel objected vocifer­
ously to the consolidation. Counsel informed the court that she had 
prepared only for the preliminary hearing and that the plaintiff had yet 
to engage in discovery. Furthermore, counsel for Gellman informed 
the court that she had evidence to present that was pertinent to the 
merits, but had not offered it because her understanding was that the 
130. Gellman v. Maryland, 538 F.2d 603, 605 (4th Cir. 1976). 
131. 801 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1986). 
132. See University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981). 
133. 538 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1976). 
134. /d. at 604. 
135. Id. 
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hearing was on a preliminary injunction motion. 136 
If Gellman's counsel had been forced to come forward with evi­
dence or with reasons why it was not possible to go forward with a 
consolidated trial, then the court would have been in a better position 
to judge whether Gellman's claim was frivolous' or without factual 
support. Only after giving Gellman this opportunity would it have 
been proper to render a final judgment. If the court felt that the evi­
dence introduced at the hearing was insufficient to support a finding at 
trial for plaintiff, a proposed consolidation order would have helped 
determine if the court's perception was on target. The modification of 
Rule 65(a)(2) would make it clear to district courts that the rule was 
not intended to provide the means for judges to dispose unfairly of 
litigation in a summary manner. The rule was intended to save time 
and money by permitting courts to incorporate the preliminary pro­
ceedings into the trial on the merits by eliminating repetition of 
evidence. 
The modification would continue the present flexibility afforded 
the district courts. For instance, if a court felt it did not have sufficient 
evidence at the preliminary stage to render relief, it could consolidate 
the hearing and trial. One commentator would require even more ex­
tensive evidentiary hearings and oral argument before issuing a pre­
liminary injunction.137 The feeling is that the current standards for 
issuance of an injunction do not afford the defendant enough protec­
tion. The proposed amendment would allow a court this kind of flexi­
bility while making it clear that consolidation should not 
unnecessarily prevent or slow down the granting of preliminary relief. 
Finally, this change, which would require clear and unambiguous 
notice and the opportunity to object in a formalized fashion, would 
insure that there is a record of the proceedings. This is important be­
cause the era of the "managerial judge" 138 is here to stay. Creating a 
record thus prevents the possibility for misunderstanding and abuse 
which is possible under the rule as currently worded. It would compel 
judges, on the record, to consult with the parties before ordering con­
136. Id. 
137. Since interlocutory problems arise from the need to grant or deny relief on 
what may prove a mistaken view of the parties' rights, the court should consider 
ways of making its preliminary appraisal more accurate. The simplest way of 
doing this is to expedite the final hearing when necessary to avoid thorny prelimi­
nary issues .... Even without moving to a final hearing, the court can give fuller 
attention to the merits by allowing oral testimony and briefing the counsel in fit 
cases. 
Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 556 (1978). 
138. See generally Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982). 
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solidation. A public record of the consolidation procedure protects 
the parties from "managerial judging," the "less visible and actually 
unreviewable" method of docket management that writers have criti­
cized as giving "trial courts more authority ... with fewer procedural 
safeguards to protect [litigants] from abuse of that authority."139 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has identified some of the more flagrant abuses that 
trial and appellate courts have committed in reaching the merits after 
only a hearing on a motion for preliminary relief. Rule 65(a)(2), as 
currently worded and as interpreted by the courts, is not providing the 
safeguards required by a system in which judges play an active role. 
As the pressures on judges increase to settle litigation, to weed out 
frivolous claims, and to move other claims quickly through the sys­
tem, parties must not be subject to ad hoc, expedient procedural 
decisions. 
The proposed amendments outlined above would serve both 
courts and parties. They would prevent the kind of abuses discussed 
in this article by requiring that the parties be informed of the proce­
dural setting in which the court intends to operate. They would also 
afford the parties the opportunity to object to a consolidation order in 
much the same way as parties do when faced with a summary judg­
ment motion. The provisions would insure that due process is pro­
vided and that parties have the chance to present all the evidence they 
plan to introduce. The proposed amendments are also designed to 
avoid tying the hands of the courts. While the judges may still play an 
active role in litigation, the proposed changes clarify what that role 
should be by adding specific procedures to govern a disposition on the 
merits after only a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction. 
139. Id. at 380. 
